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RECENT CASE

OHIO V. CLARK
Supreme Court Holds Out-of-Court Statements Made by Child to Preschool
Teacher Were Not “Testimonial” Statements
Peter M. Torstensen, Jr.∗
INTRODUCTION
Cross-examination has long been considered a vital aspect of a fair
trial. 1 In fact, the Sixth Amendment’s provision that criminal defendants
“be confronted with the witnesses against [them]” has been held to
guarantee an opportunity for cross-examination in criminal trials. 2 Even in
cases where the Court has admitted out-of-court statements without crossexamination, it has adhered closely to the view of cross-examination as a
core protection of defendants’ rights. 3 The fundamental issue regarding the
relationship between hearsay evidence and the Constitution’s right of
confrontation is whether and to what extent they pursue similar objectives.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court collapsed any distinction between the
Confrontation Clause and the federal and state hearsay evidence rules,
∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2016; B.A.,
University of California, Los Angeles, 2002. I would like to express my gratitude to my
parents, Pete and Karen Torstensen, for their unconditional love and steadfast support. I am
truly proud to be their son. I would also like to thank Professor Geoffrey Bennett for his
guidance throughout this process. Finally, I would like to thank the members of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their tireless efforts. All errors are my own.
1 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (explaining that “[t]he
substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has
once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a crossexamination”); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (declaring crossexamination “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975)
(finding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of cross-examination in criminal
trials); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (same).
3 This was at the core of the Court’s holding in Ohio v. Roberts, which conditioned
its admission of hearsay evidence by an unavailable declarant on the “indicia of reliability”
that rendered cross-examination unnecessary. 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).
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holding that the right of confrontation was not offended so long as the
statements bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.” 4 After nearly a quartercentury of this reliability analysis, the Court changed course, as Roberts
often admitted hearsay evidence that the Confrontation Clause intended to
exclude. 5 Instead of looking for “indicia of reliability,” the Court now
considers whether out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant
“bear testimony” against the accused—if so, admission of the hearsay
evidence violates the right of confrontation unless there was a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. 6
Rather than providing an exhaustive definition of “testimonial”
statements, Crawford v. Washington left the resolution of that issue to
future cases, 7 and the development of an analytical framework for
testimonial statements has been uneven. 8 In an effort to provide clarity to
the testimonial inquiry, the Court announced in Davis v. Washington what
has come to be known as the “primary purpose” test, which requires an
objective inquiry into the purposes of the out-of-court statements being
offered as evidence. 9 However, it is not immediately apparent whose
primary purpose must be considered, 10 as the articulation of the test can
easily be read to require an inquiry into the purposes of the interrogator or
the declarant, or both. 11 Michigan v. Bryant also added several other
considerations to the “primary purpose” inquiry, 12 which risk complicating
4 Id.; see KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 892 (8th ed.
2014) (noting that “Confrontation Clause analysis under Roberts and admission under the
hearsay rules . . . merged into a single inquiry”).
5 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–63 (2004) (arguing that the right of
confrontation was not intended to be subject to “amorphous notions of ‘reliability’” and
criticizing Roberts for admitting “core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause
plainly meant to exclude”).
6 Id. at 68; see id. at 51 (finding the Confrontation Clause applicable to statements
bearing testimony against the accused).
7 Id. at 68.
8 See David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 115, 136–37 (2012) (arguing that the development of the “testimonialnontestimonial” distinction from Crawford may have been uneven, at least in part, because
it attempts to discern the subjective motivation of the declarant through objective factors).
9 See 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). The Court decided Davis and Hammon v. Indiana
in the same opinion. Id. at 813.
10 See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 368 (2011) (arguing that the problem of
mixed motives requires an inquiry into both).
11 See id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that neither Crawford nor Davis
addressed whose perspective was relevant to the “primary purpose” inquiry).
12 The Court considered additional factors for determining whether there was an
ongoing emergency—such as the presence of a weapon, the injuries suffered by a declarant,
whether there was an interrogation, and the formality surrounding the statements, see id. at
363–69 (majority opinion)—which has arguably complicated the analysis, see Crump, supra
note 8, at 136.
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the analysis of testimonial statements even further. While Bryant did not
address the question, reserved in Davis, regarding the effect of statements
made by a declarant to a private party, 13 that situation was squarely
presented in Ohio v. Clark. 14
I.

CASE FACTS

Darius Clark, or “Dee,” lived with his girlfriend and her two children
in Cleveland, Ohio. 15 Clark was also his girlfriend’s pimp, and he
frequently sent her to Washington, D.C. to work as a prostitute. 16 In March
2010, while his girlfriend was on one such trip, Clark was left in charge of
her three-year-old son, L.P., and eighteen-month-old daughter, A.T. 17 The
following day, L.P.’s teacher noticed that he had a bloodshot eye and red
lash marks on his face. 18 L.P.’s preschool teacher, Ramona Whitley,
notified the lead teacher, Debra Jones, who asked L.P. about what had
happened. 19 After initially saying he had fallen, L.P. eventually answered
the questions by saying, “Dee, Dee.” 20 Whitley contacted a child abuse
hotline regarding the suspected abuse. 21 When Clark came to pick up L.P.
from school, “he denied responsibility for the injuries and . . . left with
L.P.” 22 The next day, a social worker went to the Clark residence and took
the two children to the hospital, where a physician discovered additional
injuries consistent with child abuse. 23 L.P. had a black eye, several belt
marks, and numerous bruises, while A.T. had two black eyes, a burn mark
on her cheek, and indications that her pigtails had been ripped out at the
base. 24
The grand jury indicted Clark for five counts of felonious assault, two
counts of domestic violence, and two counts of child endangerment. 25 At
trial, the State introduced the out-of-court statements made by L.P. as
evidence establishing Clark’s guilt, but L.P. did not testify as the Ohio trial

Bryant, 562 U.S. at 357 n.3.
135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2177–78. The Court noted that it, like the Ohio courts, used initials to refer
to Clark’s victims. Id. at 2177 n.1.
18 Id. at 2178.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
13
14
15
16
17
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court found him incompetent to testify. 26 Under Ohio law, children
younger than ten years of age are incompetent to testify if they “appear
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.” 27 The Ohio
trial court relied on state evidence rules to admit the out-of-court statements
made by L.P. to his teacher, finding that they bore adequate indicia of
reliability. 28 Clark moved to exclude the statements made by L.P. to his
teacher under the Confrontation Clause, but the trial court denied the
motion, finding that the statements made by L.P. did not implicate the
protections of the Sixth Amendment. 29 The jury found Clark guilty of all
but one of the assault counts and sentenced him to twenty-eight years’
imprisonment. 30
On appeal, the state appellate court reversed the conviction on the
ground that admission of L.P.’s out-of-court statements violated the
Confrontation Clause. 31 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the appellate court, albeit on slightly different grounds. 32 The court
determined that L.P.’s statements were testimonial, as the primary purpose
of the teacher’s questioning was “to gather evidence potentially relevant to
a subsequent criminal prosecution” rather than “to deal with an existing
emergency.” 33 In addition, the court also found that Ohio had a mandatory
reporting obligation law, which requires certain professionals, including
teachers, to report instances of suspected child abuse to the authorities.34 In
the court’s view, the mandatory reporting obligation transformed the
teachers into agents of the State, which made the statements they elicited
from L.P. “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony.” 35

26 State v. Clark, No. 96207, 2011 WL 6780456, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011),
rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). The trial court held a hearing on November 16, 2010, and
found L.P.—then four years old—incompetent to testify. Id.
27 Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting OHIO R. EVID. 601(A)).
28 See id. (citing OHIO R. EVID. 807).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See Clark, 2011 WL 6780456, at *2, *11.
32 See State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 600–01 (Ohio 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2173.
The Ohio Supreme Court found that the primary purpose of both teachers, Jones and
Whitley, was to collect evidence to fulfill their duty to report abuse. See id. at 600.
33 Id. at 597.
34 See id. at 596.
35 Id. at 600 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11
(2009)).

OHIO V. CLARK

2016]

II.

151

MAJORITY OPINION

It is worth noting that this appeared to be an easy case for the Court. 36
It concluded, somewhat narrowly, that the out-of-court statements by L.P.
to his teacher did not implicate the protections of the Confrontation Clause,
as the primary purpose of the statements was not testimonial. 37 After
curiously referencing Roberts’ “indicia of reliability” standard, 38 the
majority summarized the Court’s confrontation precedents—beginning
with Crawford v. Washington and concluding with Michigan v. Bryant. 39
The Court explained that Crawford applied the Confrontation Clause to
witnesses who bear testimony against the accused, and it defined
“testimony” as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact.” 40 Having defined “testimonial”
statements, Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the
introduction of testimonial evidence by witnesses not testifying in court,
unless they were unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 41
The Court then reviewed its subsequent confrontation cases—in
particular Davis v. Washington 42 and Michigan v. Bryant 43—which have
further developed the requirements for determining when a statement is
testimonial. 44 It noted that Davis articulated what had come to be known as
the “primary purpose” test, defining when statements made to police
officers would—and would not—be testimonial. 45 The Court explained:
36 The Court unanimously found that these statements were not testimonial. Clark,
135 S. Ct. at 2183; id. at 2183–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2185
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). But there was strong disagreement in the proper
reasoning to be applied. See infra Part III.
37 See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
38 Id. at 2179 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). The reference is
curious, in part, because the Court’s decision in Crawford overruled Roberts, and the
majority opinion referenced Roberts in such a way as to suggest that it was still a viable
approach. Compare id. (describing Crawford as a new approach without suggesting that
Roberts had been overruled), with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004)
(rejecting the Roberts approach), and id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment)
(“I dissent from the Court’s decision to overrule . . . Roberts.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, subsequent opinions of the Court have expressly recognized that Crawford
overruled Roberts—it did not simply provide another approach. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 353 (2011) (noting that Crawford overruled Roberts); Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (same).
39 See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179–80.
40 Id. at 2179 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
41 Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).
42 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
43 562 U.S. 344.
44 Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179–80.
45 Id. (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
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Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
46
prosecution.

According to the Court, Bryant determined that the “primary purpose”
inquiry required consideration of “all of the relevant circumstances.” 47
Bryant had reiterated the primary purpose requirements from Davis, but it
also noted that there might be circumstances beyond those indicating the
existence of an ongoing emergency that could objectively indicate that a
statement was not made with the primary purpose of establishing facts for
future prosecution. 48 The Bryant Court considered the existence of an
ongoing emergency as simply an additional factor informing the ultimate
“primary purpose” inquiry. 49 The Court noted that Bryant also viewed the
formality of the interrogation as another factor that required consideration,
noting that informal “questioning [was] less likely to reflect a primary
purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accused.”50
Finally, the Court observed that the Confrontation Clause was not meant to
preclude admission of those out-of-court statements that were understood at
the time of the founding to be admissible in criminal trials without crossexamination. 51 Thus, the majority determined “the primary purpose test is
a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-ofcourt statements under the Confrontation Clause.” 52
While the Court indicated that this case presented the very question
that it had reserved in earlier cases—whether out-of-court statements made
to private persons implicated the Confrontation Clause—it declined to
adopt a categorical rule excluding out-of-court statements made to private
persons as beyond the Sixth Amendment’s reach. 53 However, the Court

Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
Id. at 2180 (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369).
Id. (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 374).
Id. (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366). Bryant considered additional factors that
could have a bearing on the inquiry. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 371–75 (considering
circumstances, such as a shooting victim found alone in a parking lot without knowledge of
the party responsible for the injuries, the fact that the involvement of a gun created an
additional danger to the public at large, and the purpose of the officers’ questions).
50 Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366, 377).
51 Id. (citing Giles v. California 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6, 62 (2004)).
52 Id. at 2180–81.
53 See id. at 2181.
46
47
48
49
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found it highly relevant that L.P. was speaking to his teachers. 54
Comparing the facts and circumstances of the instant case with those
present in Davis, Hammon v. Indiana, and Bryant, the Court determined
that the primary purpose of the conversation between L.P. and his teacher,
similar to the conversations in Davis and Bryant, was to respond to an
ongoing emergency, as opposed to an effort to gather evidence to be used
in a future prosecution. 55 The Court also observed that it was incredibly
unlikely that a child of his age would ever “intend his statements to be a
substitute for trial testimony.” 56 Finally, the Court found that statements
similar to those at issue in the instant case had been generally admissible at
common law. 57
The Court also rejected Clark’s contentions that Ohio’s mandatory
reporting requirements transformed the statements L.P. made to his
teachers into testimonial statements, given the “natural tendency [of these
kinds of statements] to result in [the] prosecution [of a defendant].” 58 It
dismissed this argument for two reasons. First, the Court found that any
good teacher would have acted with the primary purpose of removing the
child from harm’s way, regardless of any state reporting requirement.59
Second, the Court found it irrelevant that the mandatory reporting
requirement “had the natural tendency to result in Clark’s prosecution.”60
It noted that both Davis and Bryant permitted the introduction of statements
that were provided in response to police interrogations, as their purpose
was not primarily testimonial. 61 The reporting obligation, the Court
concluded, “does not change our analysis.” 62
III.

CONCURRING OPINIONS

A. Justice Scalia Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Court’s
judgment and with its decision to avoid answering two questions
unnecessary to decide the case: (1) whether the Ohio mandatory reporting
law transformed private actors into agents of the State for purposes of the

See id.
See id. (noting that Davis and Bryant both involved circumstances that were
unclear to the responding officers that required asking questions of the victim to secure their
safety, while the victim in Hammon had already been separated from her alleged attacker).
56 Id. at 2182.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 2183.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
54
55
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Confrontation Clause, and (2) whether a more permissive test for
determining whether a statement is testimonial should apply to
interrogations by private actors. 63 Applying the “usual test applicable to
informal police interrogation,” Scalia concluded that L.P.’s statements were
not testimonial. 64 In particular, L.P.’s primary purpose in making the
statements was “not to invoke the coercive machinery of the State,” nor
were his teachers attempting to “establish[] facts for later prosecution.” 65
Finally, the conversation, viewed as a whole, did not possess the “requisite
solemnity . . . . adequate to impress upon [L.P.] the importance of what he
[was] testifying to.” 66 This, according to Justice Scalia, was all that was
necessary to decide the case. 67
As the majority opinion went beyond what he believed was necessary
to decide the case, Justice Scalia wrote separately to “protest the . . .
shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so
recently rescued from the grave in Crawford v. Washington.” 68 He argued
that the Court’s recent cases, beginning with Crawford, sought to bring the
application of the Confrontation Clause back in line with its original
meaning: testimonial statements by out-of-court witnesses must be
excluded unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. 69
Scalia took issue with the
characterization of Crawford as a different approach. 70 While noting that
“snide detractions do no harm,” Scalia argued that dicta on legal points has
a significant potential to mislead. 71 In particular, the suggestion that the

63 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). While Scalia expressed relief that the
majority declined to employ a more permissive test for interrogations by private persons,
there is some reason to believe that in function, if not in form, the Court’s opinion would
allow just that. Despite declining to hold statements made to persons who are not police
officers as categorically beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause, the Court noted that
“[s]tatements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and
prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial.” Id. at 2182
(majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008)).
Given the suggestion that statements made to persons who are not police officers are
unlikely to implicate the Confrontation Clause, it is no stretch to conclude that a more
permissive test is a likely consequence of the Court’s decision—or a step in that direction.
64 Id. at 2183–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 Id. at 2184.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See id. (“Crawford remains the law. But when else has the categorical overruling,
the thorough repudiation, of an earlier line of cases been described as nothing more than
‘adopt[ing] a different approach,’ as though Crawford is a matter of twiddle-dum twiddledee preference . . . ?” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 2179 (majority opinion))).
71 Id.

2016]

OHIO V. CLARK

155

“primary purpose” test was “necessary, but not always sufficient” had no
support in the Court’s confrontation case law. 72 Instead, he argued, the
“primary purpose” test sorted out interactions with a police officer where
an individual was, and was not, acting as a witness. 73 In addition, he
referred to the majority’s assertion that a party seeking the protection of the
Confrontation Clause must provide “evidence that the adoption of the
Confrontation Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence
that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding.” 74
Scalia argued this was backwards, as the Confrontation Clause was a
procedural requirement that, once invoked by the defendant, required the
prosecution to introduce evidence sufficient to establish a longstanding
practice of admitting evidence of this type without the need for crossexamination. 75 The Court’s opinion, Scalia suggested, appeared to be “an
attempt to smuggle longstanding hearsay exceptions back into the
Confrontation Clause.” 76
B. Justice Thomas
Despite agreeing with much of the majority’s analysis, Justice Thomas
wrote separately to highlight the missed opportunity to provide guidance on
the application of the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court statements made
to private persons. 77 Finding the “primary purpose” test inapplicable, 78
Thomas advocated an approach—also advocated in Davis v.
Washington 79—that “assess[ed] whether [the] statements [bore] sufficient
indicia of solemnity to qualify as testimonial.” 80 Thomas argued that the
Confrontation Clause was designed to protect against the particular abuses
Id. at 2184–85 (quoting id. at 2180–81 (majority opinion)).
See id. at 2185. This assumes the Sixth Amendment operates as a procedural rule,
as opposed to an evidentiary rule.
74 Id. (quoting id. at 2182 (majority opinion)).
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
78 See id. (arguing that “[t]he primary purpose test . . . is just as much ‘an exercise in
fiction . . . disconnected from history’ for statements made to private persons as it is for
statements made to agents of law enforcement, if not more so” (alteration in original)
(quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment))).
79 547 U.S. 813, 836–37 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (advocating an approach to analyze testimonial statements based on
sufficient indicia of solemnity).
80 Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Davis, 547 U.S. at 836–37 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)) (asserting that he would apply
“the same test for statements to private persons that I have employed for statements to
agents of law enforcement”).
72
73
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that occurred under the English bail and committal statutes—in particular,
the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”81
Given this history, Thomas asserted that the Confrontation Clause was
targeted to confront witnesses who bear testimony against the accused,
where testimony is defined as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” 82 Thus, he argued
that a confrontation analysis should turn, at least in part, on a solemnity
analysis. 83
IV.

FUTURE BATTLEGROUNDS

Given the tenor of the Court’s confrontation cases since Davis and its
recent decision in Clark, it is worth considering the potential battlegrounds
in future cases attempting to provide needed clarity to the “testimonial”
framework. In particular, the Court needs to address (1) the scope of an
“ongoing emergency,” (2) whose perspective (interrogator or declarant) is
relevant to the “primary purpose” inquiry, and (3) whether the testimonial
inquiry changes when evaluating statements made to private individuals.
Bryant offers some preliminary answers to these issues, 84 but they have
proven less than desirable for lower courts. 85 Clark considered creating a
different test to evaluate statements made to private persons for their
testimonial or nontestimonial character.86 Ultimately, the Court declined to
provide a categorical rule, likely due to the fact that the “primary purpose”
test proved sufficient to resolve the case without resort to an in-depth
analysis of the identity of the person to whom the statements were made. 87
Each of the aforementioned problems will be considered in turn.
81 Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 835 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
82 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
83 Justice Thomas referred to certain categories of out-of-court statements that would
bear adequate indicia of solemnity, which would thus be excluded under the Confrontation
Clause. See id. “Statements ‘contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’ easily qualify.” Id. (quoting White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)). In addition, he noted that “formalized dialogue” while in police custody, as
long as it followed any Miranda warnings, could bear adequate indicia of solemnity to
qualify as testimonial statements. Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 840 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
84 Bryant provided a more expansive view of an “ongoing emergency,” see Michigan
v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359–65 (2011), and concluded that the perspectives of both the
interrogator and the declarant were relevant, see id. at 367.
85 See, e.g., People v. Fackelman, 802 N.W.2d 552, 573 (Mich. 2011) (attributing a
split decision to the difficulty in “synthesiz[ing] several very-difficult-to-synthesize
Confrontation Clause decisions of the Supreme Court”).
86 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
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A. Ongoing Emergencies and Relevant Perspectives for the Primary
Purpose Inquiry
The confrontation jurisprudence in the wake of Crawford—
particularly in Bryant—has not been the model of clarity. 88 While Clark
did not have occasion to consider the scope of ongoing emergencies or the
proper perspective to consider in a primary purpose inquiry, its casual
reliance upon the principles from Bryant 89 suggests further retrenchment
from the categorical overruling of Roberts. Clark did not engage in much
of an analysis regarding the potential reach of ongoing emergencies, yet it
found Bryant instructive. The teachers were concerned with the safety of a
vulnerable child, the identity of the abuser was unknown, and the teachers
had no way of knowing whether any other children in their charge might be
at risk. Based on these factors, the Court found that the teachers’ questions
were aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency. 90 The real problem with
ongoing emergencies after Bryant is overinclusiveness—the broader the
conception of “ongoing emergency,” the narrower the applicability of the
Confrontation Clause. 91 This overinclusiveness could essentially eviscerate
the right of confrontation, and it is hard to imagine that “[t]he Framers
could . . . have envisioned such a hollow constitutional guarantee.” 92 Such
a broad view of an ongoing emergency might portend a return to the
Roberts regime.
In conducting the primary purpose inquiry, the majority considered
the perspectives of both the interrogators (L.P.’s preschool teachers) and
the declarant (L.P.). 93 Without much difficulty, the Court concluded that
the primary purpose of both the teachers and L.P. was to resolve an
88 See Fackelman, 802 N.W.2d at 573 (referencing the Court’s “tortuous
[confrontation] jurisprudence”).
89 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015). The Court concluded that L.P.’s
statements occurred in the midst of an ongoing emergency, see id., but it is not clear that this
characterization of L.P.’s statements was necessary to the decision. In particular, the
existence of an ongoing emergency was not an essential predicate to finding that the
statements were nontestimonial. See id. at 2180 (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 374). In
addition, the majority considered the perspective of both the declarant and the interrogator,
see id. at 2181–82, which was the approach suggested in Bryant, see supra note 84.
90 See supra note 89. It is hard to imagine that, in the absence of finding an ongoing
emergency, the Court would be forced to conclude that L.P.’s statements were made with
the primary purpose of establishing facts for future prosecution. Unnecessarily expanding
the scope of an “ongoing emergency,” however, carries a very real risk of undermining the
right of confrontation in closer cases.
91 See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 387–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
definition of “ongoing emergency” had no real limiting principle).
92 Id. at 389; see also id. at 388–89 (arguing that the “distorted view” of the Court
created an “expansive exception” to the right of confrontation, which would not have been
endorsed by the Framers).
93 See supra note 89.

158

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 91:3

ongoing emergency. 94 The Court’s evaluation of the perspectives of both
the interrogator and the declarant appears to further entrench the approach
taken in Bryant. 95 Justice Scalia has argued, however, that the only
relevant perspective is that of the declarant. 96 The Bryant approach created
no problems in Clark because the motives, at least when viewed through
the lens of a reasonable person, were aligned. 97 However, it is not hard to
imagine circumstances when a declarant and an interrogator have
conflicting motives. 98 While the Bryant approach does not propose a direct
solution to this issue, it seems likely that the resolution of these cases
would be left to the discretion of judges, who would be “free to reach the
‘fairest’ result under the totality of the circumstances” 99—an outcome that
would be a step back towards Roberts.
B. Placing Statements Made to Private Persons Within the “Testimonial”
Framework
The Court was unwilling to establish a categorical rule for statements
made to private persons, but its approach suggests that these statements are
significantly less likely to implicate the Confrontation Clause.100 In the
context of out-of-court statements made to police officers, the “primary
purpose” test functions as a binary approach to the testimonial
determination. That is, a statement is either determined to be made for the
purpose of resolving an ongoing emergency (nontestimonial) or with a
view towards prosecution (testimonial). 101 As the “primary purpose”
inquiry is an objective one, 102 this makes sense. The police officer stands
clothed in the compulsory authority of the State, charged with the duty of
investigating crimes. When there is not an ongoing emergency, it is quite
reasonable to assume that police interviews, even those of a more informal
nature, are likely to be used in future prosecutions. Statements made to
private persons, however, are more likely to fall into a hazier middle
ground—neither made to resolve an ongoing emergency nor made for the
purpose of future prosecution. This appears to be an area with great

See supra note 89.
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Ohio v. Clark, 135 U.S. 2173, 2181–82 (2015) (finding that the primary
purpose of both L.P. and his teachers was to resolve an ongoing emergency).
98 Bryant, 562 U.S. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 Id.
100 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
101 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
102 See id.
94
95
96
97
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potential for confusion. 103 For the time being, however, it appears that the
“primary purpose” inquiry may be sufficient for the task. Clarifying its
confrontation jurisprudence should be a point of emphasis for the Court in
the near future.
CONCLUSION
The heart of the debate over the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
is the manner in which confrontation was intended to secure a defendant’s
rights—either through procedural fairness or ensuring evidentiary
reliability. The eventual direction the Court takes will depend, in large
part, on which of these visions of the Confrontation Clause ultimately
prevails. Bryant marked a potential step in the direction of the Roberts
vision, and Clark does not appear to have departed from the course set in
Bryant. Thus, while Crawford marked a sea change in the Court’s
confrontation jurisprudence, the Court’s recent decisions—including
Clark—appear to have chipped away at Crawford’s categorical holding:
testimonial statements offered by an unavailable declarant are inadmissible
unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. It
remains to be seen how much of Crawford’s holding will ultimately
survive.

103 In this respect, the approach advocated by Justice Thomas is commendable, as it
would likely make the “testimonial” inquiry much clearer. See supra notes 77–83 and
accompanying text.

